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Abstract—Input languages, which describe the set of valid
inputs an application has to handle, play a central role in
language-theoretic security, in recognition of the fact that
overly complex, sloppily specified, or incorrectly implemented
input languages are the root cause of many security vulnera-
bilities.
Often an input language not only involves a language of
individual messages, but also some protocol with a notion
of a session, i.e. a sequence of messages that makes up a
dialogue between two parties. This paper takes a closer look
at languages for such sessions, when it comes to specification,
implementation, and testing – and as a source of insecurity.
We show that these ‘session’ languages are often poorly
specified and that errors in implementing them can cause secu-
rity problems. As a way to improve this situation, we discuss
the possibility to automatically infer formal specifications of
such languages, in the form of protocol state machines, from
implementations by black box testing.
Keywords-protocol state machine; language-theoretic secu-
rity; formal specification; fuzzing; reverse engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
Protocol state machines, by which we mean finite state
machines or automata that describe the message sequences
that can occur as sessions for some protocol, have played an
important role in much of the security research we have done
over the years. This research investigated the security of
software for smartcards, incl. bank cards and e-passports [1],
[2], [3], [4], feature phone midlets [5], a hardware security
token for internet banking [6], [7], and networking protocols
such as SSH [8] and SSL/TLS [9]. This paper gives an
overview of the research direction that evolved here, where
state machines are used to analyse the security of software.
Motivation for writing this paper was the realisation that
the use of protocol state machines to specify session lan-
guages fits nicely with the ideas behind language-theoretic
security. After all, as soon as the interaction between two
systems not just involves some data format but also some
protocol, then the input language effectively consists of two
levels: a language of messages, which describes the data
format of individual messages sent from one party to the
other, and a language of sessions, or message sequences,
which describes valid dialogues between two parties.1
Where much of the work on language-theoretic security
focuses on the former level (and rightly so, as this is where
most of the security problems arise), the focus of this paper
is on the latter, i.e. on session languages. We explore the
differences between languages of messages and languages
of sessions, argue that the languages of protocol sessions
can and should be more explicitly and formally specified,
and show examples of security vulnerabilities that are caused
by incorrectly implementing them. We also discuss the pos-
sibilities of automatically inferring protocol state machines
from implementations. Algorithms to do this are known from
automata theory, notably Angluin’s L* algorithm [10], and
available in libraries such as LearnLib [11]. Especially in
the absence of clear specifications, this can be a useful first
step in taking a more rigorous and structured approach to
session languages.
Of course, recognising the importance of rigorously spec-
ifying, implementing, verifying, and testing protocols is
nothing new. For an interesting historical overview of work
on protocol engineering in the 1970s and 1980s we refer to
[12].
II. SESSION LANGUAGES
Many protocols involve the notion of a session, a sequence
of messages exchanged between two or more parties follow-
ing some standard pattern. For example, security protocols
such as SSH or SSL/TLS rely on very specific sequences
of messages to establish shared keys and then use these.
Implementing such a protocol then not only involves pars-
ing and interpreting individual messages, but also keeping
track of the order of these messages and checking some
interdependencies. Specifying a protocol therefore not only
1Note that it is somewhat confusing to call the session language an input
language, as it involves both inputs and outputs.
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involves specification of the language of messages, but also
specification of the session language.
Most protocols have a so-called happy flow, i.e. a normal
sequence of messages that happen in most or all ‘correct’
sessions. But even if the session language is effectively just a
single sequence of messages, any implementation will have
to cope with errors that deviate from this happy flow, and
do so in a right – and secure – way. Here errors can occur
in an individual message (e.g., in a cryptographic protocol,
a message with an incorrect MAC) or in the order in which
messages are received.
To handle errors a common pattern is that some errors
will cause the session to be aborted, while others are
simply ignored. Ignoring a message can happen silently,
or result in an error message to warn the other party that
a message was ignored. Which approach is taken depends
on the type of protocol, and the potential harmfulness of
the message. For example, any error in the critical phase
of a security protocol (say, during key negotiation) should
typically lead to this phase being aborted and restarted, as
these protocols are notoriously fragile: a small deviation
from the correct protocol run may completely destroy all the
security guarantees that the protocol is meant to provide.
Apart from handling errors, protocols often include cor-
rect messages that may be inserted at any stage. One
example is the by now infamous HEARTBEAT message in
TLS, which can be sent at any time during a connection
when no handshake is being performed [13]. Other exam-
ples, for SSH, are the SSH_MSG_IGNORE message, which
can be sent at any moment but should always be ignored
(this message can be used for traffic padding, to defeat
traffic analysis) and the SSH_MSG_DEBUG message which
is included for debugging purposes.
Restrictions on the order of messages also arise in many
situations where there is some form of access control. For
example, often a smartcard will only perform a security-
critical operation after it has received the correct PIN code,
and then only once. Many security requirements can in
fact be expressed by constraints on the order of messages
using, for example, temporal logic. Indeed, state machines
(or automata) have been proposed as a general framework
to define categories of security policies [14], namely those
that can be enforced by runtime monitoring.
III. IMPLEMENTING SESSION LANGUAGES
When it comes to implementing a protocol, there are
fundamental differences between message languages and
session languages.
Handling an individual incoming message can be cleanly
done in two separate stages: first parsing the message and
then processing the resulting parse tree. For the first stage
one would ideally use a parser generated from a formal
grammar. Of course, in practice these stages are often not so
cleanly separated, but mixed together in a ‘shotgun parser’
[15].
Handling the session language is messier, as it has to be
done incrementally, one message at a time. We cannot wait
for the entire session to be completed, and then feed that
whole string to a parser for the session language. If we have
a formal specification of the session language, we might be
able to generate some code from that, but this then typically
results in a skeleton of code that still has to be manually
refined to include the required functionality.
There are different ways in which an implementation can
keep track of the protocol session. A program can include
one or more variables to explicitly keep track of the protocol
state. Alternatively, a program can simply use the program
point to provide information of the protocol state; this is
what happens if we use sequential composition to compose
actions.
To illustrate these two approaches, suppose the session
of some protocol is always A;B;C;D, where A and C are
inputs and B and D the resulting outputs. This might then
be implemented as
receiveA();sendB();receiveC();sendD();
where the program point then keeps track of the session
state. Of course, the implementation should not forget how
to cope with incorrect sequences of inputs, for example by
throwing an exception when receiving an unexpected input.
Alternatively, we could use some state variable state, ini-
tialised to say 0, and implement the protocol as a repetition
of the procedure below
step() {
receiveMsg(in);
if (in==A && state==0)
{ sendB(); state=1; }
else if (in==C && state==1)
{ sendD(); state=2; }
else
{ ...// raise error }
}
Here there is a more explicit use of a state machine in the
implementation.
Of course, implementations can combine the approaches
above, or use more advanced ways to implement the desired
control flow. For example, OpenSSH, which is written in
C, uses a global array with 256 function pointers to track
the protocol state. To process a new incoming message,
this array is used to jump to the right procedure to handle
that message, based on one byte in the SSH packet that
indicates the type of the packet. The contents of the global
array are updated at various stages, to change the protocol
state. This is an efficient way to implement a state machine,
and arguably a clever use of function pointers, but trying to
understand the behaviour from the code is far from trivial.
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Doing a security code review [16] of OpenSSH, we did
confirm that OpenSSH followed the RFCs. To do this, we
first drew protocol state diagrams, as discussed in the next
section, based on the RFCs. Then, when reading the source
code, we used these as a reference to understand and check
what the code did. We could not contemplate checking the
correctness of an implementation like OpenSSH without
drawing the protocol state machines.
IV. SPECIFICATION OF SESSION LANGUAGES
The session language of a protocol is commonly specified
in prose. Sometimes message flow diagrams or message
sequence charts are added, but usually only as examples.
Such diagrams typically abstract over the actual payloads of
messages and only look at the types of these messages. More
importantly, they usually only consider the ‘happy flow’.
When protocols are more complicated, and they for in-
stance include several happy flows, session languages can be
more conveniently – and precisely – described by finite state
machines. (Instead of a finite state machine one could of
course use a grammar or, in simple cases, a regular expres-
sion. However, a description with a state machine is usually
more natural, because the notion of ‘state’ often captures
more information than just which subsequent sequences of
messages are accepted. So it may make sense to distinguish
two states even though they accept the same language.)
Apart from the improved precision and clarity, another
advantage of a protocol state machine is that it provides a
first step towards an implementation, namely one which uses
a program variable to track the protocol state, as discussed
above. For this is it is useful if protocol states are named
or numbered. Protocol specifications are often meticulous in
defining a naming or numbering scheme for the different
message types, but often do not introduce any names for
protocol states.
We have noticed that in typical protocol specifications
the session language is less likely to be rigorously defined
than the message language. Most specifications will have
an appendix with a BNF grammar to define the format of
messages2, but many only use prose to describe the session
language. One factor explaining this, at least for RFCs, may
be that RFCs are in ASCII, so including a state machine is
tricky. Still, the RFC for TCP shows that this can be done,
as it includes a protocol state machine drawn in ASCII art
[17].
Extracting the protocol state machine from a prose de-
scription can be a lot of work. Typically, the prose will
describe constraints on correct sequences of messages, and
such constraints are then scattered throughout a long spec-
ification document (or several documents). What to do in
case of deviations from the happy flow is often left implicit.
2Of course, ideally the BNF grammar should be the specification, and
not just an informative supplement to the specification in English prose.
We once spent several days poring over the RFCs defining
SSH (RFCs 4250-4254) to understand the protocol state
machine of SSH, which is absent in the RFCs. When doing
this we realised that anyone implementing SSH will have
to do exactly the same work. Including explicit protocol
state machines in a protocol specification, even if these are
just partial state machines describing some sub-protocols,
can save programmers implementing them a lot of work.
This then also helps to ensure more uniform behaviour
across different implementations and reduces the room for
deviations from the specification, which might introduce
security flaws.
Beyond the happy flow(s)
The full state machine that has to be implemented is
always more complicated than a state machine that just
specifies the happy flow: even if all protocol runs conform to
a single fixed sequence of messages, the implementation will
have to cope with errors, which can be errors in individual
messages or errors in the order of messages.
Erroneous messages may be silently ignored by an im-
plementation or may result in the session being aborted –
and possibly restarted. In a protocol state machine, ignored
messages result in ‘self loops’, i.e. a transition from a state
back to itself. Aborting a session results in many transitions
that jump to some error state or back to an initial state.
For example, in Fig. 1, which gives the state machine of a
payment application on a bank card, we can see many self-
loops and many transitions back to the second state from
the top, which is effectively the start state of a session.
A robust implementation should be able to handle any
sequence of inputs. So for every state the state machine
should specify what should happen for every possible input.
The technical term for this is that the state machine is input-
enabled.
Trying to draw all these transitions in a state machine
quickly becomes very messy. It is not so clear what the
best way is to specify the full state diagram in practice
here. Merging transitions which have the same source and
destination state, as done in the lower diagrams in Fig. 1,
can help in keeping a state machine readable. Omitting
the transitions that abort the session or that are ignored
from the state machine, and specifying these in prose, can
be a practical option. An alternative approach, used in
StateCharts [18], is to use nested states, so that common
error transitions from a collection of states only have to be
drawn once.
V. HOW THINGS CAN GO WRONG
Incorrectly implementing the protocol state machine can
result in incompatibilities between different implementa-
tions, but also in exploitable security flaws. A flaw may
enable Denial-of-Service attacks, namely if a strange se-
quence of inputs crashes an implementation. Accepting an
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incorrect sequence of messages in a cryptographic security
protocol can easily break security guarantees the protocol is
meant to provide. More generally, a bug in the protocol state
machine may allow an attacker to by-pass some security
check. And if a protocol consists of various sub-protocols,
which in practice is often the case, messages coming in the
wrong order can cause unwanted feature interaction between
the sub-protocols.
One extreme example of an insecure implementation of
SSH we came across was an SSH client that did not include
any implementation of a protocol state machine whatsoever
[8]. This meant that the user could for instance be asked for
a username and password before any session key had been
established. The programmers had carefully followed the
specs in implementing the handling of individual messages,
but had completely forgotten to check if these messages
came in the correct order. Obviously, the implementation
worked fine with any compliant SSH server; that there was
additional behaviour that an attacker could exploit would not
be noticed in normal use.
We discovered another security vulnerability due to a
flawed protocol state machine in a token for internet banking
used by one of the largest banks in the Netherlands [6]. This
flaw was more shocking because it was not in a small open
source code project, but in a commercial project for a bank
which presumably has been subjected to thorough security
reviews, and which left millions of customers with a flawed
(and unpatchable) device. The USB-connected device, which
contains a smartcard reader, contained a bug that made it
possible to by-pass the crucial security check – the user
pressing the OK button – with a non-standard sequence of
USB commands. So the protocol state machine implemented
in the device had one transition that should not be present,
as can be seen in Fig. 2.
Differences between implementations of the protocol state
machine may also be used for fingerprinting. Error messages
triggered by ‘incorrect’ sequences of inputs often reveal
unique characteristics of a particular implementation. For
example, analysis of electronic passports from ten different
countries revealed that the nationality could be determined
from error messages reported in abnormal sessions [3], even
though the protocols for electronic passports have been
specifically designed not to leak information to an attacker.
There is a comment hidden away in one of the documents
that make up the official specification of electronic passports
[19] about a standard error message that should be reported
in case of incorrect inputs. However, this comment is not
very clear and has apparently been overlooked in virtually
all implementations we looked at.
We conjecture that bugs in the implementation of a
protocol’s state machine are less likely to produce a pro-
grammable ‘weird machine’ [20] than bugs in the handling
of the format of individual messages. (Indeed, we have
never encountered any.) Intuitively, bugs in the protocol
state machine may allow an attacker to skip some security-
critical step; bugs in parsing the more expressive language
of individual messages are more likely to expose a lot of
variety in behaviour which an attacker can try to ‘program’
with carefully crafted inputs.
VI. MODEL-BASED TESTING OR STATEFUL FUZZING
To detect flaws in implementations, a formally specified
protocol state machine can be used for model-based testing,
where random sequences of messages are fired at an imple-
mentation under test to check if the responses match the ones
predicted by the state machine. We have for instance used
model-based testing to check the compliance of electronic
passports [4], using protocol state diagrams [5] made on the
basis of the United Nations ICAO specifications.
Model-based testing against a state machine model is
essentially a stateful form of fuzzing. Such stateful fuzzing
can be considered as a next stage after so-called protocol
fuzzing, where one fuzzes the various fields in the protocol
message format. Stateful fuzzing is supported by fuzzing
tools such as Peach [21] and SNOOZE [22]. State-based
fuzzing has for example been used on the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) used in VoIP [23], on IEEE 802.11 wireless
networks [24], and to a limited extent on GSM phones [25].
Of course, one might hope to avoid the whole problem
of having to look for flaws in the implementation of the
protocol state machine by generating code from some formal
specification. However, as discussed in Section III, generat-
ing implementations from specifications seems harder to do
for the session language than for the message language. Of
course, it is possible to generate code from state machines,
and various development methods provide support for this
(e.g. UML), but either the models have to be very expressive,
or what is generated is a code skeleton that still needs to be
refined manually.
VII. EXTRACTING SPECIFICATIONS FROM
IMPLEMENTATIONS
Interestingly, it is possible to automatically infer a proto-
col state machine from an implementation, using just black
box testing. The techniques for this date back to work in
automata theory, in particular Angluin’s L* algorithm [10].
We only came across this technique recently, but it has been
used for security analyses by others before, e.g. to analyse
botnets [26] and more recently web applications [27].
All that is needed to infer a state machine is a test harness
which can fire typical protocol messages at an implemen-
tation and record the resulting response. The messages that
the test harness can send should cover the different types of
messages that occur in the protocol. With such a test harness
one can then infer the protocol machine using tools such as
LearnLib [11] or Tomte [28].
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Figure 1. Automatically inferred protocol state machine of a smartcard application in a bank card [1]. The top image shows the raw results, in the middle
image transitions with the same source and destination have been merged if they result in the same response, and in the bottom image all transitions with
the same source and destination have been merged in one arrow labelled ‘Other’.
In the bottom image it is easy to check that verification of the PIN, which happens in the VERIFY branch, must be taken before performing the security
critical step, which in this protocol is the branch labelled ”GENERATE AC 1st TC”.
We first used this technique to extract protocol state
machines from applications on the chips in bank cards
[1], which nearly always implement a variant of the EMV
(Europay-Mastercard-Visa) protocol. Fig. 1 gives an ex-
ample. Earlier, this technique had already been used on
electronic passports [29]. In the bank cards we found a
surprising variety in implementations, but no exploitable
security flaws.
In some cases making a test harness is very simple. For
example, our test harness for EMV bank cards only contains
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300 lines of code. For more complex protocols, such as TLS,
making a test harness is considerably more work. Still, for a
given protocol such a test harness only has to be made once,
and it can then be used to analyse any implementation of
the protocol. This makes it worthwhile to produce such test
harnesses for important standard protocols.
The state machine models obtained in this way are only
guaranteed to be an abstraction of the implementation.
Without looking at the code of the implementation it is
impossible to exclude the possibility that there is additional
behaviour that the automated inference did not detect. So a
well-hidden backdoor (or Easter egg) in the implementation
will not be detected. Still, in our experience many flaws in
the program logic typically will be revealed.
Using a Lego robot to operate the keyboard, we also
used state machine learning to analyse the flawed internet
banking token discussed earlier. The models obtained, shown
in Fig. 2, reveal the security flaw in the original device and
confirm that this flaw has been fixed in the newer version
[7]. The models in Fig. 2 use a limited alphabet of input
messages, namely combined messages that occur together
in a normal session to perform an online payment. Inferring
the state machine of the device with a larger input alphabet
reveals a very complex state machine, shown in Fig. 3. We
see no reason for it to be so complex: the device only has
to be able to (i) ask for a PIN (which is then sent to the
smartcard), (ii) display some data, (iii) ask the user to press
OK or CANCEL, and then (iv) get the smartcard to sign
a transaction if – and only if – the user pressed OK. The
complexity is rather worrying, as it complicates the job of
ensuring that all the flows are secure. As the device is closed
source and implements a proprietary, secret protocol, we can
only guess at the causes of this complexity, and whether this
is deliberate, due to a sloppy specification of the protocol,
or due to a sloppy implementation.
Looking at networking protocols, Fiterau-Brostean at al.
used state machine inference on TCP implementations [30].
This revealed differences between the state machines imple-
mented for TCP on Windows 8 and Ubuntu Linux that can
be used for fingerprinting [30]. In fact, the differences found
are similar to those used by tools such as nmap [31] for OS
fingerprinting.
Using the technique on eight TLS implementations [9]
revealed a surprising variety in the protocol state machines:
all implement a different state machine, as shown in Fig. 4.
Most implementations have more states than expected and
have behaviour that seems unnecessary. Given that security
protocols are notoriously fragile, any superfluous behaviour
in an implementation merits serious attention. Indeed, for
three of the eight implementations, namely GnuTLS, Java
Secure Socket Extension, and OpenSSL, the spurious be-
haviour raises new security concerns, as discussed in [9].
Additionally, the state diagram inferred for OpenSSL also
revealed a security vulnerability already discovered earlier,
namely CVE-2014-0224 [32], which has been present since
the first release of OpenSSL.
The flaw in Java Secure Socket Extension (caused by the
dashed arrow in Fig. 4) has been assigned CVE identifier
CVE-2014-6593. It has independently been found by Beur-
douche et al. [33], who nicknamed it FREAK; they also
recognise the role of flawed state machines as root cause.
In some cases the spurious behaviour found in the TLS
implementations is not enough to lead to an actual exploit,
but does weaken security guarantees, and so it should be
removed. For example, the TLS handshake phase, which
establishes the session keys, ends with an integrity check
where the client and server exchange and compare MACs
(Message Authentication Codes) computed over all the
messages that were exchanged as part of the handshake.
This guarantees that they saw the same messages. However,
in GnuTLS, a HeartbeatRequest message sent during the
TLS handshake phase will corrupt this MAC, as it has the
unwanted side-effect of clearing the buffer used to store the
handshake messages. An attacker might use this to by-pass
the integrity check. Though in itself this does not provide
an exploit, it is an unwanted and unnecessary weakness.
Of course, even for the implementations where the spuri-
ous behaviour turned out to be harmless, the extra behaviour
simply should not be there, if only to avoid the extra work in
assessing the security impact. All this does raise the question
what the ‘best’ – or, the ‘correct’ – protocol state machine
for TLS is. The simplest state machines in Fig. 4 are obvious
candidates.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
An important message of the work on language-theoretic
security is that input languages should be more precisely
defined, in order to tackle a root cause of security flaws in
software. We argue that this not only applies to the languages
of individual input messages, but also to languages of proto-
col sessions, i.e. languages of sequences of messages. These
session languages are typically (and often poorly) described
in prose, with sentences describing constraints on message
sequences scattered throughout long specifications (or even
across multiple documents that make up the specification),
and not with a clear and complete protocol state machine.
We have seen that several security flaws have their root cause
in the flawed implementation of a protocol state machine.
How large and important this category of security flaws is
remains to be seen. The differences in implemented protocol
state machines can also be used for fingerprinting.
The results obtained using state machine inference suggest
this is an interesting technique to automatically extract
protocol state machines from implementations using black
box testing. This can be a useful first step to look for strange
behaviour in an implementation. Moreover, the models ob-
tained this way can provide a first step towards clearer
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Figure 2. Protocol state machines of the flawed internet banking token (left) and the fixed version (right), for a restricted input alphabet [7]. In the fixed
version asking a so-called cryptogram in the bottom state results in an error, and not a cryptogram, because the user has not pressed OK yet.
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COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT
s7
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT
s8
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
s9
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT
s10
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /LONG_ERROR ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUTUSB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /LONG_ERROR COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /LONG_ERROR
COMBINED_PIN /OK
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT ROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
s11
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT ROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
ROBOT_CANCEL /SHORT_ERROR
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUTUSB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
s12
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
s13
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK s14
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT
s15
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
s16
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /EMPTY_CRYPTOGRAM
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT COMBINED_PIN /OKROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUTCOMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /OK ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT ROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /SHORT_ERROR
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUTUSB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUTUSB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
s17
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
ROBOT_CANCEL /SHORT_ERROR
COMBINED_PIN /OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /OKUSB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUTCOMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /CRYPTOGRAM
s18
ROBOT_OK /OK
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUTROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
ROBOT_CANCEL /SHORT_ERROR
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
s19
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK s20
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUT
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /CRYPTOGRAM
COMBINED_PIN /OK
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUTCOMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /OK
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
ROBOT_OK /OK ROBOT_CANCEL /SHORT_ERROR
COMBINED_PIN /OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /LONG_ERRORUSB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /LONG_ERROR COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /LONG_ERROR
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /CRYPTOGRAM
COMBINED_PIN /OK
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /OKROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUTCOMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
ROBOT_CANCEL /SHORT_ERROR
COMBINED_PIN /OK
USB6_SIGNDATA /OK USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /VALID_CRYPTOGRAM
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
s21
ROBOT_OK /OK
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_PIN /TIMEOUT
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /TIMEOUT
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUT
COMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
USB8_CRYPTOGRAM /VALID_CRYPTOGRAM
COMBINED_PIN /OK
USB7_DISPLAY_TEXT /TIMEOUT
USB6_SIGNDATA /OK
ROBOT_OK /TIMEOUTROBOT_CANCEL /TIMEOUTCOMBINED_INIT /CARD_INSERTED||INSERT_OK
Figure 3. Protocol state machine of the flawed internet banking token, for a more extensive input alphabet. This figure is not meant to be readable, but
is included to illustrate the worrying – or, from the attacker’s point of view, promising – complexity.
specifications of existing session languages. One obvious
direction for future work is applying state machine inference
to more protocols, to see how useful this technique is in
revealing strange behaviour or security weaknesses. Another
question is if we can come up with reference state machine
models of important protocols, such as TLS.
Any spurious or non-standard behaviour in a protocol
implementation can lead to insecurity, and even if it does
not, it makes it harder to check that the implementation is
secure. As has been noted many times before [34], [35], it
may be time to deprecate Postel’s Law – ‘Be conservative in
what you send, be liberal in what you accept’ –, which was
introduced in times when security was less of a concern, and
also be conservative in what an implementation accepts.
The fact that these session languages are so poorly de-
scribed in typical specifications is all the more disappointing
because there is such a nice specification formalism that can
be used for this, namely finite state machines. To summarise
our message in a slogan:
No more prose specifications of protocol state
machines!
If the full state machine is large and complex, separate
state machines of sub-protocols can be given. Introducing
names for protocol states, or protocol phases that correspond
with sets of protocol states, can be useful for talking about
the state machines, and these names can even be used as
constants in program code.
Drawing the complete protocol state machine, that is
input-enabled and describes all errors that can occur, may
result in too many transitions for the result to be conve-
niently readable. Resorting to English prose to describe the
non-happy flows may be the best (or only) option, but this
should then not be done in sentences scattered in various
places in long documents, but all in one place.
Our original motivation for looking at protocol state
machines was to formally specify and verify code [8], [5] or
to generate provably correct code [2]. However, in the end
we expect that they are more useful simply as a convenient
specification formalism: it can help designers of protocols
to clearly specify these (and encourage them to keep their
protocols simple!), help programmers in producing correct
and secure implementations, and help in the security analysis
of implementations.
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Figure 4. Protocol state machines inferred for eight TLS server implementations. (From top left to bottom right: GnuTLS v3.3.8, PolarSSL v1.3.8, Java
Secure Socket Extension v1.8.0, OpenSSL v1.0.1, MiTLS v0.1.3, RSA BSafe C v4.0.4, NSS v3.17.1, and RSA BSafe Java v6.1.1.) The main point here
is to show the large variety; for a thorough discussion of the differences and their impact on security see [9].
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